Many local public goods are provided in coalitions. When coalitions form they may have the power to exclude members. The core applies to such cases. When coalitions cannot exclude members, all who prefer the provided public good can join. The no-exodus equilibrium is proposed for such cases. It...

The financial trilemma states that financial stability, financial integration and national financial policies are incompatible. Any two of the three objectives can be combined but not all three; one has to give. This paper develops a model to underpin the financial trilemma. Our findings for...

Economic interactions often take place in open communities, in which agents are free to leave a community to join a more preferred one. Tiebout (1956) conjectured that “voting with feet” might generate considerable efficiency gains since individuals with different preferences sort themselves...

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. Rather,...

The combination of the challenges emerging from the 2020 pandemic outbreak, amid an unprecedented macroeconomic context, and a limited EU budget, inevitably call for reflections about synergies, or ‘vertical coherence', between EU and national budgets. The proposals for a larger EU budget, the...

Results-based, collective action, value chain, and land tenure contracts are means to improve the management of agri-environmental public goods. The objective of this paper is to assess the understandability, applicability, and perceived economic benefit of each of these contract types by land...