emergence of new business models. The increasing roles of digital platforms as well as data-driven markets represent two …

In this paper, we analyse the final decisions for merger cases prepared by the European Commission (EC) since 1990 and … build a unique subsample for all non-cleared cases. These incorporate all merger notifications which were either withdrawn …

consultants) anticipate the critical questions and potential paths that should be addressed regarding antitrust merger risk. This … affected merger review, investments, decision making, and counsel. The surveys also offer antitrust agencies an opportunity to …Estimating antitrust risk is fundamental to identifying, proposing, and pricing deals. A more informed understanding of …

attributable to the markets of concern. (i.e., by the “overlap”). If an antitrust agency challenges a merger having only a small …Most mergers involve multiple markets. The potential for settlement can vary by the fraction of the overall deal … to litigation. Regulators, antitrust attorneys, and expert economists have long wondered if the degree of overlap …

. The antitrust agency’s incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its …We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system … implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced. …

Digital platforms operate in multisided markets providing services through the internet to two or more distinct groups … group. Therefore, online platforms usually present both direct network effects, between individual members of the same group … mergers in two-sided markets, taking account of the recent practice of the Commission …

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our … remedies, and preventions – phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the ….2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find that phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers …

use a novel database that identifies over 20,000 product/geographic antitrust markets affected by over 2,000 mergers … many industries around the world since the 1980s. Two major criticisms of these studies is that concentration and market … scrutinized by the European Commission between 1995 and 2014. We show that concentration, as measured by the market-specific post-merger …

We model merger control procedures as a process of sequential acquisition of information and compare US and EU … that for global mergers that have the same effect in the two jurisdictions, a decision to trigger a Phase II in the EU …