Common ownership fundamentally upsets the well-settled merger enforcement ecosystem. Not only it challenges basic principles informing merger policy such as the presumed profitability of mergers for the merging firms and the merger-specificity of potential efficiencies but also it works against...

The spread of minority equity interest by large investors within productive sectors has garnered theattention of major institutions worldwide. This work draws a picture of such “common ownership”in the European energy industry in 2007-2018, by means of novel indicators covering both the...

We analyze the influence of firm ownership structure on corporate social responsibility (CSR) as measured by the Dow Jones Sustainability STOXX Index and the Ethibel Excellence Index. Using data from 1,248 firms from five major European Union countries (United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy,...

The literature shows that horizontal shareholding engenders significant anticompetitive effects and that no suitable instrument exists within European competition law which reliably and effectively can be applied to curtail such intrinsic effects. This Article analyses several proposals which...

Theory offers differing perspectives and predictions about the impact of product market competition on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using firm-level data on CSR from 2002 through 2015 and panel data on competition laws in 48 countries, we discover that intensifying competition induces...

Industry-wide voluntary agreements are touted as a means for corporations to take more corporate social responsibility (CSR). We study what type of joint CSR agreement induces firms to increase CSR efforts in a model of oligopolistic competition with differentiated products. Consumers have a...

Examining the US Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, I find that facilities reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 7.0% after mandatory disclosure of facility-level emissions. A facility's prior GHG inefficiency predicts subsequent GHG emissions reductions, but only after public disclosure occurs,...

Vital in preserving managerial accountability, the firmly established one share, one vote rule provides shareholders with limited rights to elect directors who appoint managers and to approve certain extraordinary transactions. Without the deterrents of risk of capital loss and fear of removal,...

We analyze collusion under demand uncertainty by cartels such as OPEC that care about the utility derived from profits by citizens. When citizens are sufficiently risk averse and fixed operating costs are non-trivial, it becomes difficult for cartels to collusively restrict output both when...