We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the...

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the...

The interaction of monetary and fiscal policies is a crucial issue in a highly integrated economic area as the European Union. We argue that EMU, which introduced a common monetary policy and restrictions on fiscal policy at the national level, increases the need for macroeconomic policy...

There are legal grounds to hear competitors in merger control proceedings, and competitor involvement has gained significance. To what extent this is economically sensible is our question. The competition authority applies some welfare standard while the competitor cares about its own profit. In...

We study antitrust enforcement that channels price-fixing incentives through setting fines and allocating resources to detection activities. Antitrust fines obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy...

There are legal grounds to hear competitors in merger control proceedings, and competitor involvement has gained significance. To what extent this is economically sensible is the focus of our game-theoretic analysis. The competition authority applies some welfare standard while the competitor...

This article investigates rationalizable implementation in social environments where agents can provide hard evidence on the private information they possess. Specifically, we study necessary and sufficient conditions for virtual implementation using a notion of Rationalizability that captures...

The paper presents a large-population analog of fictitious play in which players learn from personal experience. In each period, only one player updates his beliefs about the strategy distribution in the population. Through analysis and examples, we justify the relevance of the single update...

We study a simple dynamic contribution game between two competitors. During each period, two firms compete on a product market after having made irreversible contributions improving their rival's production cost (e.g., releasing trade secrets). In order to take full advantage of each other's...