Market risk reporting in banking has assumed such importance during the last decade. The purpose of this paper is to provide a methodology to evaluate the qualitative and quantitative profiles of the market risk disclosure in banking. We propose a hybrid methodology to assess whether or not...

We measure a systemic risk faced by European banking sectors using the CoVaR measure. We propose the conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR) for measuring a spillover risk which demonstrates the bilateral relation between the tail risks of two financial institutions. The aim of the study is to...

In this paper we propose a measure of systemic risk in the financial sector, the expected systemic shortfall (ESS) indicator. The ESS-indicator is the product of the probability of a systemic default event and the expected tail loss in case this systemic event occurs. We compute the indicator...

Using a novel cross-European dataset on bank internationalization, the paper accounts for both organizational and geographic complexity and evaluates its impact on systemic risk and how both the 2008–09 global financial crisis and the 2010–11 European sovereign debt crisis might have...

We quantify the gains from regulating maturity transformation in a model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors' preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. Pecuniary...

We investigate the drivers of systemic risk and contagion among European banks from 2007 to 2012. First, we derive a systemic risk measure from the concepts of MES and CoVaR analysing tail co-movements of daily bank stock returns. We then run panel regressions for our systemic risk measure using...

We quantify the gains from regulating banks' maturity transformation in an infinite horizon model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors' preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic...

We quantify the gains from regulating maturity transformation in a model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors’ preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. Pecuniary...