Based on an analysis of cartel prosecutions since 2007, this article assesses the way the European Commission has built …

Justice has great latitude in recommending corporate cartel fines to the federal courts, and its recommendations are nearly … direct test of the optimal deterrence theory of antitrust crimes.Regressions are fitted to a sample of the corporations that …-deterrence model is quite good. We find that U.S. corporate cartel fines are strongly directly related to economic injuries from …

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Union and the United … results show that on average these cartel overcharges are significantly larger than the criminal fines of either the European …

While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political ….S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing … penalties related to fines and jail terms. There appear to be four distinct cartel policy regimes: pre-1978, 1978-1992, 1993 …

While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political ….S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing … penalties related to fines and jail terms. There appear to be four distinct cartel policy regimes: pre-1978, 1978-1992, 1993 …

economic perspective. It reviews the theory, practice, and evidence of optimal fines and assesses whether the European …

This paper analyzes the first 13 cartel decisions of the European Commission under its 2006 revised fining guidelines …. I find that the severity of the cartel fines is more than five times higher than those figured under the previous 1998 … rare) examples of supra-deterrence. Nearly all recent cartel decisions reward one or more participant with full or partial …

This article analyzes the first 22 cartel decisions of the European Commission under its 2006 revised fining Guidelines …. I find that the severity of the cartel fines relative to affected sales is about double that of the fines decided under … the previous 1998 Guidelines. Severity varies only modestly across companies in the same cartel. A large minority of EC …

the predictive power of the optimal deterrence theory of antitrust violations in the EU. In addition, they offer insights … absolute Commission fine. Independent variables fall into four groups: the extent of the cartel’s antitrust injuries; factors … cartel; and controls for time, for changes in EC guidelines, for nationality of the defendant, and for industry …