In this paper, we set forth a scoreboard for dealing with those risks that arise from the governance of any organization. Firstly, we introduce the subject of governance risks and, secondly, we move on to a cardinal index that not only measures up governance performance but also provides with a...

In this Article we submit that the compensation structures at banks before the financial crisis were not necessarily flawed and that recent reforms in this area largely reflect already existing best practices. In Part I we review recent empirical studies on corporate governance and executive pay...

Vital in preserving managerial accountability, the firmly established one share, one vote rule provides shareholders with limited rights to elect directors who appoint managers and to approve certain extraordinary transactions. Without the deterrents of risk of capital loss and fear of removal,...

Negative risk-decoupling, otherwise known as empty voting, is a popular strategy amongst hedge funds and other activist investors. In short, it is the attempt to decouple the economic risk from the share's ownership position, retaining in particular the voting right without risk. This paper uses...

We examine the political dynamics which led to the codification of the Principles and Standards for sound compensation practices at financial institutions at international (G 20) level and to their subsequent implementation on both sides of the Atlantic. We show that the regulation of bankers'...

The paper outlines the developments in the EU regulatory framework for executive remuneration since 2004 and going through the financial crisis. It also presents the results of an analysis of the remuneration practices adopted by the largest European listed firms before and after the crisis,...