We show that tax competition in the EU is shaped by four interrelated institutional mechanisms: 1) Market integration, by reducing the transaction costs of cross-border tax arbitrage in the Single Market, 2) enlargement, by increasing the number and heterogeneity of states involved in intra-EU...

Tax competition in the European Union is shaped by four partly opposed institutional mechanisms. While market integration and enlargement increase competitive pressure, the tax co-ordination of the Council of Ministers and the tax jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice could potentially...

Warum macht die Harmonisierung der Unternehmens- und Kapitalertragsbesteuerung in der Europäischen Union kaum Fortschritte, obwohl sie im Binnenmarkt heftigem Steuerwettbewerb ausgesetzt ist, und warum ist die Umsatzbesteuerung weitgehend harmonisiert worden, obwohl sie gegen Steuerwettbewerb...

The paper analyzes the common assumption that the EU has little power over taxation. We find that the EU’s own taxing power is indeed narrowly circumscribed: its revenues have evolved from rather supranational beginnings in the 1950s towards an increasingly intergovernmental system. Based on a...

The paper analyzes the common assumption that the EU has little power over taxation. We find that the EU's own taxing power is indeed narrowly circumscribed: Its revenues have evolved from rather supranational beginnings in the 1950s towards an increasingly intergovernmental system. Based on a...