This study provides a comprehensive picture of experimental Kreps-Scheinkman markets with capacity choice in the first stage and subsequent price competition at the second. We conduct seven different treatments of such markets, varying the number of firms, the demand rationing scheme, the...

For criminal violations of the Sherman Act, although guided by federal sentencing guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice has great latitude in recommending corporate cartel fines to the federal courts, and its recommendations are nearly always determinative. In this paper, we analyze the...

While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political preferences that guide such antitrust prosecutions remain understudied. We empirically examine the intertemporal shifts in U.S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period...

While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political preferences that guide such antitrust prosecutions remain understudied. We empirically examine the intertemporal shifts in U.S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period...

In a vertical market experiment featuring a wholesale market and a retail market we investigate the countervailing power hypothesis of Galbraith (1952). Counter to standard models of imperfect competition this hypothesis proposes that increasing concentration of retail firms might be beneficial...

In a Stackelberg oligopoly with cost asymmetry and possibility of entry, the Stackelberg leader faces a kinked demand curve. For a robust interval of cost of the leader, the equilibrium price is rigid with respect to small changes in demand and costs of active firms

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Union and the United States are at the optimal levels. The article does this by collecting and analyzing the available information concerning the size of the overcharges caused by hard core pricing...

We use laboratory experiments to examine the effect of firm size asymmetry on the emergence of price leadership in a capacity constrained price-setting duopoly. With discounting, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the timing game we analyze predicts that the large firm is an endogenous...

This paper discusses a model of vertical and horizontal product differentiation within the Dixit-Stiglitz framework of monopolistic competition. Firms compete not only in prices and horizontal attributes of their products, but also in the quality that can be controlled by R&D activities. Based...

The paper analyses the impact of import penetration on firms’ profitability in 15 manufacturing industries in 10 euro area countries during 1995-2004, focusing on the role of emerging market economies. Our results indicate that import competition from emerging market economies has had an...