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Efficiency and collusion neutrality of solutions for cooperative TU-games
Brink, René van den - 2009
use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion … these axioms characterize the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency …, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378796
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Comparable axiomatizations of the Myerson value, the restricted Banzhaf value, hierarchical outcomes and the average tree solution for cycle-free graph restricted games
Brink, René van den - 2009
satisfies collusion neutrality, while the Myerson value satisfies component efficiency. Requiring both efficiency and collusion …. Since these solutions also satisfy the superfluous player property, this also `solves' an impossibility for TU-games since … there is no solution for these games that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. We give …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379462
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Multi-player agents in cooperative TU-games
Brink, René van den; Dietz, Chris - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720511
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Consistency, monotonicity and implementation of egalitarian shapley values
Brink, René van den; Funaki, Yukihiko; Ju, Yuan - 2007
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372987
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Axiomatization and implementation of discounted shapley values
Brink, René van den; Funaki, Yukihiko - 2010
player property for delta = 0. We show that efficiency, symmetry, linearity and this delta-reducing player property …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380928
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Efficient formulas and computational efficiency for glove games
Belau-Garmann, Julia - 2013
A well known and simple game to model markets is the glove game where worth is produced by building matching pairs. For glove games, different concepts, like the Shapley value, the restricted Shapley value or the Owen value, yield different distributions of worth. Moreover, computational effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211890
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Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
Brink, René van den; Chun, Youngsub; Funaki, Yukihiko; … - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010190987
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From hierarchies to levels : new solutions for games
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Brink, René van den; Laan, … - 2015
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players ́possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532576
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Transmission network investment across national borders : the liberalized electricity market
Persson, Lars; Tangerås, Thomas P. - 2018
, with an aim to increase aggregate efficiency and achieve equitable distribution of the gains from market integration.​ …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926087
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Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation
Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021
In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012494898