We provide an introduction into the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or efficient) dynamic mechanisms. These mechanisms extend the well known Vickrey-Clark-Groves and D'Aspremont-Gérard-Varet...

Preface / by Eric Maskin -- "Introduction", September 2019 -- "Learning and strategic pricing", Econometrica, 64:1125-1150, 1996 -- "Experimentation in markets", 2000, Review of economic studies, 67:213-234 -- Market diffusion with two-sided learning", RAND journal of economics, 28:773-795, 1997...

We provide an introduction to the recent developments in dynamic mechanism design, with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or efficient) dynamic mechanisms. These mechanisms extend the well-known Vickrey-Clark-Groves and D'Aspremont-Gérard-Varet...