Public choice economists began studying the economics of anarchy in the 1970s. Since then, the amount of research on anarchy has burgeoned. This article surveys the important public choice contributions to the economics of anarchy. Following the lead of the early public choice economists, many...

Threats of mass revolts could effectively constrain a dictator's public policy if it were not for the collective-action problem. Mass revolts nevertheless happen, but they follow a stochastic pattern. We describe this pattern in a threshold model of collective action and integrate it into an...

We assess Gordon Tullock's work on dictatorship and revolutions using a common analytic framework that captures the dynamics of mutually reinforcing perceptions within a potentially rebelling subgroup of a population. We can reconstruct all of Tullock's central findings but we also find him...

This paper discusses various ways to organize these consultations, so that a compromise agreement is reached on the solution of the (re)distribution problem. These institutionalized structures of consultation are referred to as 'matching zones' here. Practical experiences, mainly from the...

This paper uses a formal model to analyze the effects of rent seeking contest on production when the contestants are both rent seekers and producers and production output is an input of rent seeking effort. Great economies of scale in rent seeking and an even distribution of rent seeking...

To a very large extent, politics is agency. Indeed, agent-principal relationships pervade public and public-private behavior. This paper reviews the extensive but not yet integrated literature applying agency concepts to political settings. This includes agency in definitions of politics or...

Why do sudden and massive social, economic, and political changes occur when and where they do? Are there institutional preconditions that encourage such changes when present and discourage such changes when absent? In this paper, I employ a general model which suggests that massive equilibrium...

A country`s judiciary, police, and security forces are essential to protect the State from external aggression. By virtue of the State`s monopoly of coercion, they maintain a stable legal framework and the safety of persons and property. All these activities enhance a society`s productivity, but...

This paper argues that corruption patterns are endogenous to political structures. Thus, corruption can be systemic and planned rather than decentralized and coincidental. In an economic system without law or property rights, a kleptocratic state may arise as a predatory hierarchy from a state...