We model the interaction between capitalists and entrepreneurs as a dynamic game. The open-loop Nash equilibrium and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium are distinguished. The purpose is to answer some questions that have arisen in the development of profit-led versus wage-led growth models. We...

We extend the model of insecure property rights by Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999) by adding three features: (i) extracting the common property asset involves a private appropriation cost, (ii) agents derive utility from wealth as well as from consumption, and (iii) agents...

This work is based on a differential game proposed by Kelvin Lancaster. The game between two agents called workers and capitalists is based on the accumulation and redistribution of benefits among social classes concluding that cooperative outcomes outperform non-cooperative. This approach...

We extend the model of insecure property rights by Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999) by adding three features: (i) extracting the common property asset involves a private appropriation cost, (ii) agents derive utility from wealth as well as from consumption, and (iii) agents...

A standard Ak-model of endogenous growth has been extended to allow for an intertemporal conflict between capitalists and workers. For the dynamic game thus obtained, an equilibrium solution in feedback Nash (Markovian) strategies have been computed. However, many equilibria in trigger...

This paper presents the long-run equilibrium and development dynamics in the neoclassical growth model and a simple model of endogenous growth when property rights are absent. The results are compared to the outcome in a corresponding model with secure property rights. The main findings are that...

We generalize the result of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) by showing that their static solution is also a time consistent Stackelberg solution of a differential game between the government and the median voter

We study the determinants of voting outcomes on the provision of public consumption through marginal income taxes in the context of the simple linear growth model. We focus on how the dynamic politicoeconomic equilibrium maps the economic fundamentals to policies and long-run growth. We find...

We study the determinants of voting outcomes on the provision of public consumption through marginal income taxes in the context of the simple linear growth model. We provide analytical results on how the dynamic politicoeconomic equilibrium maps the economic fundamentals to policies and...

Two countries face a strategic interdependence in producing intermediate goods. Producing these intermediate goods requires both of domestic capital and another imported intermediate good. Individually they determine its balanced growth path by taking into account this interdependence. By...