We develop a model wherein a reputation for prosecutorial malfeasance reduces the willingness of witnesses to cooperate with prosecutors. This causes an increase in the crime rate and in wrongly-convicted innocent defendants. Because citizens are taxpayers and may be victims, perpetrators,...

We develop a dynamic model of the disposition of a criminal case, allowing for the potential discovery of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors (who choose whether to disclose this evidence) and by defendants, as the case proceeds from arrest through plea bargaining and (possibly) trial. We...

We develop a theoretical model to identify and compare partial and equilibrium effects of uncertainty and the magnitude of fines on punishment and deterrence. Partial effects are effects on potential violators' and punishers' decisions when the other side's behavior is exogenously given....

We develop a theoretical model to identify and compare partial and equilibrium effects of uncertainty and the magnitude of fines on punishment and deterrence. Partial effects are effects on potential violators' and punishers' decisions when the other side's behavior is exogenously given....