This paper starts with a review the economics of criminal behavior. Then, the authors discuss the theory of public enforcement. The economic analysis of criminal behavior and criminal law has been a hugely successful enterprise. As an academic enterprise, it has achieved the goal of research –...

In this chapter, I briefly discuss theoretical predictions of capital punishment’s impact on crime, provide a concise history of the death penalty in the US, and review both the early and recent empirical literature

This chapter presents a public choice theory of criminal procedure. The core idea is that criminal procedure is best understood as a set of rules designed to thwart attempts to use the state's law enforcement power in a predatory fashion or in order to transfer wealth generally. For the most...

This paper presents a model of penalties that reconciles the conflicting accounts optimal punishment by Becker, who argued penalties should internalize social costs, and Posner, who suggested penalties should completely deter offenses. The model delivers specific recommendations as to when...

This essay reviews the economics of criminal procedure, proceeding through four topics in the literature. First, I review the implications of substantive criminal law theories for criminal procedure. The second part discusses the error cost model of criminal procedure, which is the dominant...

On November 14, 2013, Professor Dervan was called to testify before the United States House of Representatives' Committee on the Judiciary Over-Criminalization Task Force. Available here is his written testimony. In his written testimony, Professor Dervan examines the phenomenon of...

The criminal legal system is at a crossroads. Calls for abolition are met with calls for modest adjustments or maintenance of the status quo. What frequently emerges from these polarities is a promise that police, prosecutors, judges, and other government actors will use their vast discretion to...

The literature contains ambiguous findings as to whether statistical discrimination, e.g. in the form of racial profiling, causes a reduction in deterrence. These analyses, however, assume that enforcers' incentives are exogenously fixed. This article demonstrates that when the costs and...

A common view in the law and economics literature holds that equal increases in type-1 and type-2 error lower deterrence by the same amount. We demonstrate that this view is generally incorrect both when the court's error concerns the assessment of the alleged offender's act (mistake of act) and...

Our criminal codes are replete with “dead crimes”—i.e., crimes that are openly violated, have long gone unenforced, and no longer reflect majoritarian views. For example, many states still criminalize conduct as commonplace as engaging in certain innocuous behavior on Sundays, swearing,...