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I model the connection between the equilibrium bribe amount and the fines imposed on both bribe-taker and bribe-payer. I show that Basu’s (2011) proposal to lower the fines imposed on bribe-payers in order to induce more whistleblowing and increase the probability of penalizing corrupt...
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How do gangs compete for extortion? Using detailed data on individual extortion payments to gangs and sales from a … leading wholesale distribution firm in El Salvador, we document new evidence on the determinants of extortion payments and the … economic costs of extortion via pass-through. We exploit a 2016 non-aggression pact between gangs to examine how collusion …
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How do gangs compete for extortion? Using detailed data on individual extortion payments to gangs and sales from a … of extortion payments and the effects of extortion on firms and consumers. We exploit a 2016 non-aggression pact between … gangs to examine how collusion affects extortion in areas where gangs previously competed. While the non-aggression pact led …
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