In many trade environments - such as online markets - buyers fully learn their valuation for goods only after contracting. I characterize the buyer-optimal ex-ante information in such environments. Employing a classical sequential screening framework, I find that buyers prefer to remain...

We assume that an impatient decision maker (DM) runs variable-size experiments at an increasing, strictly convex cost before choosing an irreversible action. We introduce and solve a tractable continuous time version of this problem - a control of variance of a diffusion with uncertain mean....

We assume that an impatient decision maker (DM) runs variable-size experiments at an increasing, strictly convex cost before choosing an irreversible action. We introduce and solve a tractable continuous time version of this problem --- a control of variance of a diffusion with uncertain mean....

Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) have shown that, in auctions with incomplete information about payoffs, full surplus extraction is only possible if agents’ beliefs about other agents are fully informative about their own payoff parameters. They argue that the set of...

We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the interim distribution of types is common knowledge (the exact number of agents for each type is known), then a mechanism...