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Informational size and efficient auctions
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: The review of economic studies 71 (2004) 3, pp. 809-827
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002140230
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Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominants strategy auctions
Crémer, Jacques - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 56 (1988) 6, pp. 1247-1257
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001059869
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Implementation with Interdependent Valuations (Second Version)
McLean, Richard P. - 2013
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087801
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Implementation with Interdependent Valuations
McLean, Richard P. - 2006
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734128
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 2013 - Rev., second version
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009741315
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Information requirements for mechanism design
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 2023
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014312953