We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.

We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.

We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.

An economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered. An exogenous institutional rule prescribes what moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition. At each time an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability, and he chooses a...

An economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered. An exogenous institutional rule prescribes which moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition. At each time, an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability, and he chooses a...