Das Papier charakterisiert die spezifischen Eigenschaften des Gutes Software. Als Alternative zur Bereitstellung von Software über Märkte werden die Charakteristika der "freien" Open-Source-Softwareentwicklung dargestellt, bei der die Entwickler auf eine unmittelbare kommerzielle Verwertung...

Die bevorstehende vollständige Liberalisierung der Postmärkte im Zuge der Umsetzung des europäischen Regulierungsrahmens bietet die Chance, die Effizienz der Regulierung zu erhöhen. Wettbewerbshindernisse und Marktzutrittsbarrieren sollten konsequent ausgeräumt und bestehende...

We provide an extensive and general investigation of the effects on industryperformance - profits, social welfare and price-cost margins - of exogenously changing the number of firms in Cournot markets. This includes an in-depth exploration of the well-known trade-off between competition and...

This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or...

We investigate consequences of a situation in which a merged subgroup of firms leads the market, after which merger experiences reduced marginal cost. Results show that while introduction of higher cost synergy to the model increases firms' motive to merge, it may not necessarily mitigate...

This article analyzes endogenous efficiency gains from mergers. It considers oligopolistic homogeneous good markets and duopolistic and triopolistic markets under product differentiation (PD) (quantity and price competition). In a two-stage game, firms invest in cost-reducing innovation with and...

We present examples of cost-asymmetric duopoly games where the inefficient firm can obtain higher payoff than its efficient rival. Firms compete in a Cournot fashion and their quantities are chosen by their managers. We assume that managers are offered two types of incentive contracts, the pure...

This paper considers a government auctioning off multiple licenses to firms who compete in a market after the auction. Firms have different costs, and cost efficiency is private information at the auction stage and the market competition stage. If only one license is auctioned, standard results...

This paper analyzes endogenous efficiency gains from mergers. It considers oligopolistic homogeneous good markets and duopolistic and triopolistic markets under product differentiation (quantity and price competition). In a two-stage game, firms invest in cost-reducing innovation (with and...

We examine sales and leasing of a durable good in an asymmetric duopoly. We find that inefficient firms tend to lease more. While the low cost firm sells more than the high cost firm, the high cost firm leases more. Further, an increase in unit costs implies a higher ratio of leased units to...