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Changes in insider ownership and changes in the market value of the firm

McConnell, John J.; Servaes, Henri; Lins, Karl - In: The journal of corporate finance : contracting, … 14 (2008) 2, pp. 92-106

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003729726

International corporate governance

Denis, Diane K.; McConnell, John J. - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003651105

Corporate governance and ownership structure

McConnell, John J.; McKeon, Stephen B.; Xu, Wei - In: Corporate governance : a synthesis of theory, research, …, (pp. 303-322). 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008702091

Does board independence matter in companies with a controlling shareholder?

Dahya, Jay; Dimitrov, Orlin; McConnell, John J. - In: Journal of applied corporate finance : JACF 21 (2009) 1, pp. 67-78

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003839888

Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value

McConnell, John J.; Servaes, Henri - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003108929

Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial myopia?

Wahal, Sunil; McConnell, John J. - In: The journal of corporate finance : contracting, … 6 (2000) 3, pp. 307-329

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001501681

To live or let die? : An empirical analysis of piecemeal voluntary corporate liquidations

Erwin, Gayle R. - In: The journal of corporate finance : contracting, … 3 (1997) 4, pp. 325-354

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001237565

Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial myopia?

Wahal, Sunil; McConnell, John J. - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000990295

International corporate governance

Denis, Diane K.; McConnell, John J. - In: Journal of financial and quantitative analysis : JFQA 38 (2003) 1, pp. 1-36

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001749496

What Determines the Fraction of Board Seats Controlled by the Dominant Shareholder in a Company?

Dahya, Jay; Dimitrov, Orlin; McConnell, John J. - 2010

In their 2008 paper, Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell find that corporate values are lower when a higher fraction of the firm’s board of directors is associated with the dominant shareholder, especially in countries with weak legal regimes. Our study presents a simple model that is consistent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194348