We analyze horizontal mergers when the acquirer holds a passive partial ownership stake (PPO) in the target firm prior to the merger. We show that a PPO reduces the minimal synergy level necessary to make a merger beneficial for consumers. It follows that an antitrust authority ignoring existing...

This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly with minority shareholdings. We find that, with high market concentration and sufficiently convex demand, there is no scope for cross-ownership to improve welfare regardless of spillover levels. Otherwise,...

In this note we consider the preferences of a profit maximizing firm for international ownership in a world in which firms compete in an international Cournot oligopoly, and in which countries use strategic trade policy. We find that firms prefer national ownership and show that full...

This paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partners' effort is not observable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV...

The common ownership debate has become one of the most contentious issues in corporate law today. This debate is a by-product of major changes to capital market ownership structure, which have triggered concerns about the rise of institutional investors, the growth of index investing, and the...

A large fraction of US public stock is held by institutional investors that frequently hold shares in multiple firms in the same industry ("common ownership"). Concerns have been raised that common ownership might harm competition if it confers influence over important strategic decisions. Using...

Recent empirical studies demonstrate the significant extent to which a small number of well-known institutional investors have taken on large ownership interests in the majority of large U.S. public companies, including large ownership interests in horizontal competitors. The response to these...

We investigate the incentives of a high-quality firm to transfer for free its proprietary product innovation technology to its standard-quality rival on which it has passive partial ownership holdings (PPOs). We identify the conditions under which there exists a non-controlling share to make...

This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly with overlapping ownership. We show that overlapping ownership leads to internalization of rivals' profits by firms and find that, for demand not too convex, increases in overlapping ownership increase...