We examine the relation between passive ownership and financial reporting quality measured by Beneish's (1999) earnings' manipulation score (M-score). We find that passive ownership is negatively related to M-score and to the likelihood of being designated as a “manipulator” firm. However,...

This paper analyzes the role of passive blockholders in corporate governance using data on Schedule 13G filings. We show that firm value increases with the number and aggregate ownership of passive blockholders after controlling for other possible determinants of firm value. More importantly, we...

Horizontal shareholdings exist when a common set of investors own significant shares in corporations that are horizontal competitors in a product market. Economic models show that substantial horizontal shareholdings are likely to anticompetitively raise prices when the owned businesses compete...

The corporate governance literature has shown that self-interested controlling owners tend to divert corporate resources for private benefits at the expense of other shareholders. Such behavior leads the controlling owners to prefer long maturity debt to short maturity debt, to avoid frequent...

Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure in Manufacture Public Companies at Indonesian Stock Exchange. This research aimed at knowing the influence of audit quality, proportion of independent commissioner, audit committee, firm size, managerial ownership and leverage. It used purposive...

This paper examines the impacts of macroeconomic uncertainty, state ownership and board composition on firm performance. First, we find state ownership is negatively related to firm performance measured by return on assets and Tobin's Q. However, Tobin's Q increases with state ownership when...

We examine whether institutional investors with short-term incentives affect firms' innovation performance. We find that firms with a greater concentration of transient and quasi-indexer institutional investors are associated with lower innovation performance, as measured by patents and...

The primary objective of the present study was to expand understanding of the determinants of adoption innovation in SME context by empirically examine the effect of corporate governance structure on manager’s innovative behavior. This was done through exploring whether ownership structure...

Asset owners (principals) typically do not manage their own investments and leave this job to delegated managers (agents). What is best for the asset owner, however, is usually not best for the fund manager. Additional agency conflicts arise when the asset owner does not know the quality and...

We examine the relation between organizational structure (public vs private) and managerial turnover in a large sample of U.S. offered mutual funds. Consistent with the hypothesis that publicly traded firms focus more on shorter term performance, we find that public sponsors are more sensitive...