This article answers, in the affirmative, two core research questions: do we need long-term shareholders and can we find them? The economy needs long-term shareholders to provide prudent and profitable patient capital, generate an antidote to corporate short-termism and spearhead managerial...

Tax codes regularly create conflicts of interests between small and large shareholders with respect to the payout decision of firms. We use this fact to study (i) whether firm behavior reflects preferences of blockholders and (ii) the effectiveness of minority shareholder protection on...

Horizontal shareholdings exist when a common set of investors own significant shares in corporations that are horizontal competitors in a product market. Economic models show that substantial horizontal shareholdings are likely to anticompetitively raise prices when the owned businesses compete...

Controlling shareholders often pledge their ownership in the firm to offer collateral for either their personal loans or loans to the firm. Pledging of shares modifies their payoff structure, without altering their control rights. This modification in the payoff structure can influence the...

Theories of delegated monitoring predict that when public disclosure is costly, monitoring by a large investor leads management to supply more private information to that investor, and less public disclosure to other similarly aligned investors who free-ride off the monitor. We test this...

This study examines the importance of the self-selection problem when evaluating returns to bidder firms around announcement events. Takeover announcements are not random because managers decide rationally whether to bid or not, this indicates announcements are timed; consequently, in the presence...

Important capital market, regulatory and technological developments have created greater investor appetite and capacity for engagement with public companies. This development is highlighted by investors’ current efforts to engage with companies in various markets on material environmental,...

It is one of the well-known cornerstones of corporate governance that (minority) share-holders are subject to a risk of being expropriated by the controller of the firm, i.e. either entrenched management under a dispersed ownership structure or a controlling share-holder under concentrated...

We argue that the stakeholder and CSR literatures can benefit from more systematic thinking about ownership. We discuss general notions of ownership in economics and law and the entrepreneurial notion of ownership we have developed in prior work. On this basis, we argue that stakeholder theory...