We study how product market competition affects firms' ownership structures using a large sample of closely-held firms in 18 European countries. We show that firms operating in more competitive environments have lower inside ownership and that the stakes of their outside shareholders are more...

Excess control rights by inside shareholders have been documented to hurt minority shareholders. This paper shows that such governance feature may benefit creditors. Using a sample of U.S. dual-class firms, I show that these firms take less operational and financial risk than similar...

We document a negative (positive) relationship between firm performance and changes in the ownership of large (small) institutional investors. Small investors "exit'' while blockholders increase their holdings following poor performance. We find evidence that large investors increase ownership...

In corporate innovation, the type of institutional ownership matters. Using exogenous shocks from mergers of financial institutions, we identify two countervailing effects of common ownership on corporate innovation. Higher common ownership by focused, long-term dedicated institutional investors...