Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms’ corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners (and the different types of large...

We are interested in understanding how agency conflicts in private firms arise through ownership structures and family relationships. Specifically, we analyze auditors' increase of effort and firms' choice of auditors in situations with higher level of agency conflicts. For a large sample of...

We are interested in understanding how agency conflicts in private firms arise through ownership structures and family relationships. Specifically, we analyze auditors' increase of effort and firms' choice of auditors in situations with higher level of agency conflicts. For a large sample of...

Using a large hand-collected sample of all blockholders (ownership ≥ 5%) of S&P 1500 firms for the years 2002–2009, we first document significant individual blockholder effects on earnings management (accrual-based earnings management, real earnings management, and restatements). This...