In their 2008 paper, Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell find that corporate values are lower when a higher fraction of the firm’s board of directors is associated with the dominant shareholder, especially in countries with weak legal regimes. Our study presents a simple model that is consistent...

We analyze related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their state-owned enterprise (SOEs) shareholders to examine whether companies benefit or lose from the presence of government shareholders and politically connected directors appointed by the government. We find that...

Studies of the incentives behind the expropriation of minority shareholders of publicly listed firms by their controlling shareholders focus on the publicly listed firm's performance or characteristics and treat the controlling shareholder as a black box. In this paper, we examine when and why...

We examine how the market values operating assets in the presence of time-varying ex ante risk that these assets may be tunneled away. We analyze pairs of Chinese publicly listed firms and their non-listed parents and examine the market valuation of current assets (cash balances, trade...