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German "populism" and the large public corporation

Roe, Mark J. - In: International review of law and economics 14 (1994) 2, pp. 187-202

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001164679

Political foundations for separating ownership from control

Roe, Mark J. - In: Corporate governance regimes : convergence and diversity, (pp. 113-146). 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002749600

Strong managers, weak owners : the political roots of American corporate finance

Roe, Mark J. - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013503125

Einige Unterschiede bei der Leitung von Unternehmen in Deutschland und Amerika

Roe, Mark J. - In: Ökonomische Analyse des Unternehmensrechts : Beiträge …, (pp. 333-368). 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001284275

A theory of path dependence in corporate ownership and governance

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Roe, Mark J. - In: Convergence and persistence in corporate governance, (pp. 69-113). 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002030988

A theory of path dependence in corporate ownership and governance

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Roe, Mark J. - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001441893

Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Companies

Roe, Mark J. - 2019

Law and politics affect the financial structure of the public corporation, perhaps as much as economics. Law restricts financial institutions from holding large equity blocks and from networking the small blocks they do own. Impetus for these restrictions came from several sources: a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901982

Strong Managers, Weak Owners : The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance

Roe, Mark J. - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013077745