In developed markets including the United States, family-controlled firms, in particular founder-controlled firms, have been associated with higher firm performance than their non-family counterparts. Such family-controlled firms have concentrated ownership, which according to agency theory...

This paper examines how family and non-family ownership affects the performance of Swiss listed firms from 2003 to 2010. We distinguish between these two types of controlling shareholders since they have different objectives. We hypothesise that only family shareholders have a real incentive to...

Recent research has documented that family-controlled firms are very common around the world. This paper provides new evidence on the accounting and market performance of this type of companies. The empirical investigation is conducted on a market in which family firms are well-established and...

This is an empirical study that examines the underpricing and aftermarket long-term performance of IPOs in China and IPO underpricing. Corporate governance aspects that may play a role in IPOs, such as ownership structure and external directors, are studied.The study show that firms with higher...

This paper examines the determinants of executive compensation in Chinese banking during 2005-2012. Using the fixed effects panel, 2SLS and dynamic GMM regressions, I find that there is no significant positive pay performance relation, and CEO power does not necessarily exhibit higher levels of...

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an...

Large shareholders may affect managerial decisions through the threat of selling their holdings and thereby negatively influencing price. The split-share structure of Chinese corporate ownership imposes restrictions on ownership and shares trading. Using these institutional features, we test the...