Showing 1 - 10 of 17
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003962775
We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965864
We study the short-run effect of elections on monetary aggregates in a sample of 85 low and middle income democracies (1975 - 2009). We find an increase in the growth rate of M1 during election months of about one tenth of a standard deviation. A similar effect can neither be detected in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342347
We study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the London Metropolitan Boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes: taxpayer suffrage (1902-1914) and universal suffrage (1921-1937). We argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010237194
We provide new evidence on the short-run effect of elections on monetary aggregates. We study month-to-month fluctuations in the growth rate of M1 in a sample of 85 low and middle income democracies from 1975 to 2009. The evidence shows an increase in the growth rate of M1 during election months...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491768
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008933137
We study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage individual legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008933397
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581263
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010390992
We study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage individual legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011938