This paper investigates the merits of different democratic institutions when politics is unidimensional, when there is uncertainty both about the preferences of the future electorate and the future polarization of political parties, and when politicians have better information about the state of...

American states select their judges in various ways. The method we are concerned with here is that of "merit selection." Under a typical implementation of this system, a nonpartisan commission culls applicants for judgeships, and an appointee is then selected by the governor. Then, periodically,...

We first study theoretically how intergovernmental relations affect political budget cycles (PBCs) within federal countries, introducing a national incumbent that favors aligned districts in a model where discretionary fiscal policy is subject to credibility problems. Then we analyze Argentina's...

This paper empirically investigates the underlying determinants of expenditure decentralization, based on the predictions of a new political economy model of partial decentralization. The analysis is based on an agency model, in which two levels of government are involved in the provision of a...

We investigate a case of political favoritism. Some members of the Bavarian parliament hired relatives as office employees who were paid using taxpayers' money. The family scandal was a hot issue in the German media because of the upcoming state and federal elections. We examine whether being...

This paper analyzes the impact of economic performance on voter turnout. We estimate an economic turnout model in which local economic variables are included in quadratic form, so that non-linear effects can be taken into account. We use panel datasets covering municipalities, from 1979 to 2005,...