In this paper, we present a straightforward economic model that explains the incentives to manipulate nodal energy prices in a “Day 2” RTO market. The model distinguishes between legitimate market participation that increases overall market efficiency and manipulative behavior that distorts...

In many countries, unreliable inputs, particularly those lacking storage, can significantly limit a firm's productivity. We examine industrial enterprises response to China's severe power shortages around 2003. Fast-growing demand coupled with regulated electricity prices led to blackouts...

Non-discriminatory third-party access to transportation infrastructures in electricity - transmission and distribution networks - is essential for open and effective competition in wholesale and retail electricity markets. Competition in wholesale energy markets is possible and desirable as it...

This paper examines the impact on transmission investment of the transition away from central planning by vertically integrated electric utility monopolies toward Independent System Operators (ISOs) and market incentives. After summarizing the regulatory background of the new ISOs and the...

Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-ayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination...