Energiemärkte sind längst Dauerbrenner der öffentlichen wie wissenschaftlichen Regulierungsdebatte geworden. Immer wieder wird die Frage nach effektivem Wettbewerb in der Energieversorgung kontrovers beantwortet, nicht zuletzt unter dem Eindruck steigender Energiepreise. Neben einer rein...

This paper characterizes the Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid (discriminatory), divisible-good, procurement auction. Demand by the auctioneer is uncertain as in the supply function equilibrium model. A closed form expression is derived. Existence of an equilibrium is ensured if the hazard rate...

In most wholesale electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers of supply to a uniform price auction, and the market is cleared at the price of the most expensive offer needed to meet realised demand. Such markets can most elegantly be modelled as the pure-strategy, Nash...

The increasing use of demand-side management as a tool to reliably meet electricity demand at peak time has stimulated interest among researchers, consumers and producer organizations, managers, regulators and policymakers, This research reviews the growing literature on models used to study...