Hybrid governance structures between markets and hierarchies in many industries, e.g., in energy and telecommunications, challenge antitrust and regulation policy. The paper focuses on the theoretical and methodological basis provided by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) for analyzing the...

Hybrid governance structures between markets and hierarchies in many industries, e.g., in energy and telecommunications, challenge antitrust and regulation policy. The paper focuses on the theoretical and methodological basis provided by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) for analyzing the...

In the EU electricity industry, many Vertically Integrated Utilities (VIUs) have ownership both of electricity generators and of transmission, hence VIU-owned or allied generators often are bidders in auctions for VIU-owned transmission. In Van Koten (2006) I show that welfare suffers and the...

Despite efforts made by European Commission to liberalize electricity markets and foster integration, there are still significant barriers to free competition. Until now, Romania was one of the countries that have been compliant to the European Union's electricity directives, being ahead of...

The question of third-party access to the networks has become central to the debate around the liberalisation of the European electricity markets due to the natural monopoly characteristic of the transmission network. The European Union?s electricity directive provides three institutional...

This paper applies parametric and non-parametric and parametric tests to assess the efficiency of electricity distribution companies in Germany. We address traditional issues in electricity sector benchmarking, such as the role of scale effects and optimal utility size, as well as new evidence...

Das Paper untersucht zwei Fragen: (1) Wann hat ein Stromnetzbetreiber, der zugleich im nachgelagerten Strommarkt tätig ist (vertikal integrierter Netzbetreiber), einen Anreiz, durch diskriminierende Festsetzung von Netznutzungsentgelten die Konkurrenz im Strommarkt zu behindern? (2) Kann eine...

Das Paper untersucht zwei Fragen: (1) Wann hat ein Stromnetzbetreiber, der zugleich im nachgelagerten Strommarkt tätig ist (vertikal integrierter Netzbetreiber), einen Anreiz, durch diskriminierende Festsetzung von Netznutzungsentgelten die Konkurrenz im Strommarkt zu behindern? (2) Kann eine...