This paper presents an approach for resilience incentives in the regulation of electricity network operators. Resilience is the ability of the power system to deal quickly and efficiently with large-scale and long-lasting power interruptions. It comprises two related aspects: minimizing the...

The commercial value added in electricity distribution networks and smart grids is increasing. Concerns about competition on a level-playing field are raised and the debate on vertical network unbundling is beginning to address the level of the distribution networks. With regard to the...

The electricity grid includes multiple network areas managed by different operators, with transmission system operators (TSOs) handling high-voltage areas and distribution system operators managing midto low-voltage areas. These areas are interconnected and synchronized, creating classical...

This article presents an approach to minimize the outage costs during power supply disruptions and, thus, to incentivize efficient resilience investment by network users. The central problem to be solved is the information asymmetry between network operators and network users on outage and...

This article presents an approach to minimize the outage costs during power supply disruptions and, thus, to incentivize efficient resilience investment by network users. The central problem to be solved is the information asymmetry between network operators and network users on outage and...

Smart contracts based on voluntary participation and optionality can be a low transaction cost solution to implement locational signals in distribution networks and thereby avoid network investment. This paper examines the efficiency properties of smart contracts. Based on a three-node example...

The German energy transition massively alters the market structure of electricity supply and forces incumbent electric utilities to rethink their business strategies. We analyze three main developments that undermine the former market dominance of the “Big 4” incumbents in Germany. First,...

We analyse incentive problems in coordination of network operators that purchase services for electricity networks from distributed resources. Such services are often associated with externalities that make the social optimum costly against the individual one. However, a costly reaction of other...

Self-supply can destabilize the finance of a distribution network. This paper analyses under which circumstances the tariff structure of a distribution network is stable or unstable under pressure of self-supply and provides recommendation how to change the tariff structure to restore stability...