We show that a common regulatory mandate in electricity markets that use location-based pricing that requires all customers to purchase their wholesale electricity at the same quantity-weighted average of the locational prices can increase the performance of imperfectly competitive wholesale...

This paper examines the competitive effects of reorganizing a network industry's vertical structure. In this industry, an upstream monopolist operates a network used as an input to produce horizontally differentiated final products that are imperfect substitutes. Three potential pitfalls of...

Electricity markets are prone to the abuse of market power. Several US markets employ algorithms to monitor and mitigate market power abuse in real time. The performance of automated mitigation procedures is contingent on precise estimates of firms' marginal production costs. Currently, marginal...

Modelling price formation in electricity markets is a notoriously difficult process, due to physical constraints on electricity generation and flow. This difficulty has inspired the recent development of bottom-up agent-based models of electricity markets. While these have proven quite...

Vertical separation of generation from electricity retailing has often been required as a condition of electricity market liberalisation. A well-developed and liquid contracts market is similarly suggested as necessary to manage the resulting wholesale market risks, which risks are further...

This paper studies how competition and vertical structure jointly determine generating capacities, retail prices, and welfare in the electricity industry. Analyzing a model in which demand is uncertain and retailers must commit to retail prices before they buy electricity in the wholesale...

Horizontal shifts in bid curves observed in wholesale electricity markets are consistent with Cournot competition. Quantity competition reduces the informational requirements associated with evaluating market performance because the markups of all producers then depend on the same inverse...

We investigate how the effects of market structure changes and mergers in restructured electricity markets depend on the level of forward contracting. Following Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia (2008), we develop a Cournot model of Alberta's wholesale electricity market that incorporates firms'...

We analyze the pass-through of cost changes to retail tariffs in the German electricity market over the 2007 to 2014 period. We find an average pass-through rate of around 60%, which significantly varies with demand factors: while the pass-through rate to baseline tariffs, where firms have...