We propose that local corruption distorts the allocation of government-controlled resources and impairs the contract environment, thereby reducing firms’ use or suppliers’ provision of trade credit. We use a sample of Chinese-listed firms from 2007 to 2020 to examine the role of local...

This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally provides a tournament incentive in...

This paper investigates venture capitalists' monitoring of managerial behaviour by examining their impact on CEO pay-performance sensitivity across various controlling structures in Chinese firms. We find that the effectiveness of venture capitalists' monitoring depends on different types of...

This paper examines how institutional characteristics of emerging economies influence the effect of control-ownership divergence on market liquidity. We find that the divergence is negatively associated with liquidity, and that this negative relationship is more pronounced in firms with more...