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Linkage of different countries' domestic permit markets for pollution rights into a single international market alters governments' incentives, and may trigger adjustments of the number of allocated permits. First, this work finds that in a non-cooperative equilibrium, international emissions...
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Linkage of different countries’ domestic permit markets for pollution rights into a single international market alters governments’ incentives, and may trigger adjustments of the number of allocated permits. First, this work finds that in a non-cooperative equilibrium, international...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980850
Using a non-cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010580539