Policies to cap emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the U.S. economy could pose significant costs on the electricity sector, which contributes roughly 40 percent of total CO2 emissions in the U.S. Using a detailed simulation model of the electricity sector, we evaluate alternative ways that...

Policies to cap emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), such as the recently announced agreement among seven northeastern states, are expected to have important effects on the electricity industry and on the market value of firms that own electricity generation assets. The economics literature finds...

The regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector within a cap-and-trade system poses significant policy questions about how to allocate tradable emission allowances. Allocation conveys tremendous value and can have efficiency consequences. This research uses simulation...

Water policy experts contend that the United States is heading toward a water scarcity crisis in the coming years. Global climate change is likely to make water scarcity much worse in the long run. This article argues that demands of current and projected water management challenges can best be...

This paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement for different sharing rules applied to the gains from co-operation. We use a 12-regions model designed to examine internal and external stability of coalitions (STACO). We compare different sharing rules like, for example,...

In diesem Papier wird untersucht, ob bzw. wie sich im Rahmen des Kyoto Protokolls die globalen Emissionsreduktionsziele mit der ökonomischen Rationalität der beteiligten Länder in Einklang bringen lassen. Den äußeren Rahmen der Analyse bildet eine spieltheoretische Darstellung der...

This paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement under different sharing rules applied to the gains from cooperation. We use a 12-region model to examine internal and external stability of coalitions. We determine and compare stable coalitions under different surplus...

This paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement for different sharing rules applied to the gains from co-operation. We use a 12-regions model designed to examine internal and external stability of coalitions (STACO). We compare different sharing rules like, for example,...

This paper analyzes polluters' incentives to move from a traditional command and control (CAC) environmental regulatory regime to a tradable permits (TPP) regime. Existing work in environmental economics does not model how firms contest and bargain over actual regulatory implementation in CAC...

This paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement for different sharing rules applied to the gains from co-operation. We use a 12-regions model designed to examine internal and external stability of coalitions (STACO). We compare different sharing rules like, for example,...