In a simple one-sector economy operating at full capacity, workers and firms bargain a la Nash (1950) over wages and productivity gains taking into account the trade-offs faced by firms in choosing factor-augmenting technolo- gies. The aggregate environment that arises from self-interested...

This paper aims at identifying the labour share (wage-productivity gap) as a major factor in the evolution of inequality and employment. To this end, we use annual data for the US, UK and Sweden over the past forty years and estimate country-specific systems of labour demand and Gini coefficient...

In a simple one-sector, two-class, fixed-proportions economy operating at full capacity, wages are set through generalized axiomatic bargaining à laNash (1950). As for choice of technology, firms choose the direction of factor-augmenting innovations to maximize the rate of unit cost reduction...

In a simple one-sector, two-class, fixed-proportions economy, wages are set through axiomatic bargaining a`la Nash (1950). As for choice of technology, firms choose the direction of factor augmentations to maximize the rate of unit cost reduction (Kennedy 1964, and more recently Funk 2002). The...

Faced with easier access to foreign technology and imported capital goods, firms in India's organised manufacturing sector adopted advanced techniques of production leading to increasing automation and a rise in the capital intensity of production. This has raised much concern about the ability...

This paper presents a model of secular stagnation, income and wealth distribution, and employment in the Classical Political Economy tradition, that can be contrasted with the accounts by Piketty (2014) and Gordon (2015). In these explanations, an exogenous reduction in the growth rate g...

This paper challenges the prevailing view of the neutrality of the labour income share to labour demand, and investigates its impact on the evolution of employment. Whilst maintaining the assumption of a unitary long-run elasticity of wages with respect to productivity, we demonstrate that...

In a simple one-sector, two-class, fixed-proportions economy, wages are set through axiomatic bargaining a`la Nash (1950). As for choice of technology, firms choose the direction of factor augmentations to maximize the rate of unit cost reduction (Kennedy 1964, and more recently Funk 2002). The...

This paper provides an analytical treatment of various long-run aspects of the MONA model as well as the SMEC model of the Danish economy. More specifically, the analysis lays bare the long-run and steady-state nexus between unemployment and, respectively, inflation and the wage share implied by...

In a simple one-sector, two-class, fixed-proportions economy, wages are set through axiomatic bargaining a la Nash [1950]. As for choice of technology, firms choose the direction of factor augmentations to maximize the rate of unit cost reduction (Kennedy [1964], and more recently Funk [2002])....