This paper suggests a theory of choice among strategic situations when the rules of play are not properly specified. We take the view that a quot;strategic situationquot; is adequately described by a TU game since it specifies what is feasible for each coalition but is silent on the procedures...

The problem of ex ante choice between conflict situations is studied in an axiomatic model where individuals know the available surplus but are ignorant of the exact bargaining procedure. Furthermore, allowing for side-payments in a single good, a bargaining solution that is immune to ordinal...

This paper suggests a theory of choice among strategic situations when the rules of play are not properly specified. We take the view that a "strategic situation" is adequately described by a TU game since it specifies what is feasible for each coalition but is silent on the procedures that are...

A Decision Maker (DM) must choose at discrete moments from a finite set of actions that result in random rewards. The environment is complex in that she finds it impossible to describe the states and is thus prevented from application of standard Bayesian methods. This paper presents an...