Eight centuries ago, Thomas Aquinas clearly differentiated between probability and uncertainty in decision making. He viewed probability eclectically as having elements that involved propositions about events, frequency of events, and single events. He found an important role in his approach for...

Economists, working in the Heterodox schools of economics, have severely confused Keynes's interval valued probability–weight of the evidence approach to decision making from the A Treatise on Probability, that Keynes integrated into the General Theory by way of his definition of uncertainty...

The differences between Knight's approach in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921) and Keynes's logical theory of probability approach in the A Treatise on Probability (1921), on the one hand, and the Ramsey-Savage-de Finetti Subjective or Bayesian approach, on the other hand, are based on the...

In finance, decision making and choice requires that we assume that asset prices tend to trend. This assumption also logically enables us to construct exits to limit losses and protect capital. But investors have good reason to be uneasy regarding the potential for significant loss when using a...

Adam Smith and J M Keynes were both practitioners of virtue ethics who rejected Benthamite Utilitarianism. Their axiomatic foundations consist of the following three axioms only. The first is that probabilities are nonadditive, in general. Additivity is a special case. The second is that...

This paper provides an overview of the work of Gigerenzer, thereby focusing on his criticisms of the Heuristics and Biases theory of Kahneman and Tversky. It is proposed that Gigerenzer's work can be both thematically and chronologically organized as: historical research on statistics =...

What would you do if you were invited to play a game where you were given $25 and allowed to place bets for 30 minutes on a coin that you were told was biased to come up heads 60% of the time? This is exactly what we did, gathering 61 young, quantitatively trained men and women to play this...

J M Keynes's two logical relations of rational degree of probability, α, 0≤α≤1 and Evidential Weight of the Argument, w, 0≤w≤1, where w measures the degree of completeness of the evidence, can't be represented or associated with ordinal probability, although Keynes's theory of...