Informational asymmetries abound in economic decision making and often provide an incentive for deception through telling a lie or misrepresenting information. In this paper I use a cheap-talk sender-receiver experiment to show that telling the truth should be classified as deception too if the...

Similar to welfare economics where with(out) interpersonal comparisons one defines unique (set-valued) welfare (Pareto) optima, we present a framework for one-person decision making where with(out) a prior probability distribution individual optimality prescribes usually a unique (set of)...

A general framework is described specifying how boundedly rational decision makers generate their choices. Starting from a "Master Module" which keeps an inventory of previously successful and unsuccessful routines several submodules can be called forth which either allow one to adjust behavior...

A general framework is described specifying how boundedly rational decision makers generate their choices. Starting from a Master Module which keeps an inventory of previously successful and unsuccessful routines several submodules can be called forth which either allow one to adjust behavior...

Informational asymmetries abound in economic decision making and often provide an incentive for deception through telling a lie or misrepresenting information. In this paper I use a cheap-talk sender-receiver experiment to show that telling the truth should be classified as deception too if the...

We examine social preferences of Swedish and Austrian children and adolescents using the experimental design of Charness and Rabin (2002). We find that difference aversion decreases while social-welfare preferences increase with age.