We build a satisficing model of probabilistic choice under risk which embeds Expected Utility Theory (EUT) into a boundedly rational deliberation process. The decision maker accumulates evidence for and against alternative options by repeatedly sampling from her underlying set of EU preferences...

Overwhelming evidence from the cognitive sciences shows that, in simple discrimination tasks (determining what is louder, longer, brighter, or even which number is larger) humans make more mistakes and decide more slowly when the stimuli are closer along the relevant scale. We investigate to...

Influential economic approaches as random utility models or quantal-response equilibria assume a monotonic relation between error rates and choice difficulty or "strength of preference", in line with widespread evidence from discrimination tasks in psychology and neuroscience. However, while the...

We study Nature's trade-off when endowing people with the cognitive ability to distinguish between different time periods or different prizes. Our key premise is that cognitive ability is a scarce resource, to be deployed only where and when it really matters. We show that this simple insight...

Influential economic approaches as random utility models assume a monotonic relation between choice frequencies and "strength of preference," in line with widespread evidence from the cognitive sciences, which also document an inverse relation to response times. However, for economic decisions...

Both economists and psychologists are interested in understanding decision making under uncertainty. Yet, they rely on different concepts to analyse human behaviour: Economists use economic preference parameters rooted in utility theory, while psychologists use personality traits to describe...