This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights …

independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time.We analyze the first-price auction … disclosure regime, in which each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction at the end of each round. In … equilibrium, the winner of the initial auction lowers his bids over time, while losers keep their bids constant, in anticipation …

and unobserved auction heterogeneity, and propose a Bayesian estimation method based on Bernstein polynomials. Monte Carlo … experiments show that our estimator performs well, and incorrectly ignoring ambiguity induces bias and loss of revenue. We find …

minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation …

minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation …

pay. We analyze bidding behavior in a first-price auction in which the knowledge of the bidders about the distribution of … the first-price auction exists. …