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Bayesian rationality is the paradigm of rational behavior in neoclassical economics. A rational agent in an economic model is one who maximizes her subjective expected utility and consistently revises her beliefs according to Bayes's rule. The paper raises the question of how, when and why this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113861
This paper explores archival material concerning the reception of Leonard J. Savage's foundational work of subjective-Bayesian decision-making. The focus is on the criticism raised in the early 1960s by Daniel Ellsberg, William Fellner and Cedric Smith, who were supporters of the newly developed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012838048
This paper argues that the similarities between Ellsberg's and Shackle's frameworks for discussing the limits of the probabilistic approach to decision theory are more important than usually admitted. The paper discusses the grounds on which the ambiguity surrounding the decision-maker in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144078
The existence of ambiguity presents a challenge to decision-makers as it eliminates the ability to apply standard optimization approaches, such as those based on calculating the objective expected values of alternative actions. In reality, ambiguity arises in most strategically important...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422373
The paper discusses the role of George L. S. Shackle in fostering an unconventional approach to individual decision making. Shackle's peculiar place in the history of economics is attested by the fact that, over the period going from von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games up to early...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014221103
This paper discusses the evolution of decision theory after Savage's Foundations. Two developments are examined. First, it is presented the rationale of Shackle's proposal to abandon probabilistic decision making. Second, it is discussed the axiomatisation provided by the non-additive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074083
This paper assesses the rationale of George Shackle's argument against Bayesian decision making in the light of recent developments of modern decision theory. The focus is on the so-called non-additive probability approach to decision theory under uncertainty, which, not unlike Shackle's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074577
In the history of economic thought, Shackle was one of the representative critics about probability based economic theory. Specifically, he constructed his own concept of subjective uncertainty called potential surprise to replace probability. In 1980s, the potential surprise is axiomatized by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013415891
Shackle was one of the representative critics of probability calculus. His alternative decision theory was mathematically reformalized by Katzner till 1990s. Following the Katzner's reformalized framework, this paper presents a new interpretation of Shacklean theory by focusing on the common...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013415895
This paper examines the interplay between the real and financial decisions of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty. The firm faces additional sources of uncertainty that are aggregated into a background risk. We show that the firm always chooses its optimal debt-equity ratio to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003971039