We propose a model of instrumental belief choice under loss aversion. When new information arrives, an agent is prompted to abandon her prior. However, potential posteriors may induce her to take actions that generate a lower utility in some states than actions induced by her prior. These losses...

We show that if an agent is uncertain about the precise form of his utility function, his actual relative risk aversion may depend on wealth even if he knows his utility function lies in the class of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions. We illustrate the consequences of this...

We show that if an agent is uncertain about the precise form of his utility function, his actual relative risk aversion may depend on wealth even if he knows his utility function lies in the class of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions. We illustrate the consequences of this...

We show that if an agent is uncertain about the precise form of his utility function, his actual relative risk aversion may depend on wealth even if he knows his utility function lies in the class of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions. We illustrate the consequences of this...

Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and the action taken. An information structure determines the set of possible signals and the probability of each...

A decision maker is averse to not knowing a prior over a set of restricted structured models (ambiguity) and suspects that each structured model is misspecified. The decision maker evaluates intertemporal plans under all of the structured models and, to recognize possible misspecifications,...

Using an approach based on evolution and adaptation, we provide foundations for a model of choice under uncertainty based on adaptive preferences, and we show that updating of those preferences in response to new information will respect dynamic consistency even at the cost of violating...

Much of the ambiguity that economic decision makers face may stem from scarce cognitive resources, such as limits on working-memory capacity. This paper constructs a simple model of bounded judgment based on the idea that an agent's maximum working-memory capacity is limited in two dimensions:...

Most of the conflict theory papers have used a one-shot game set-up. This does not correspond to reality and is certainly incapable of modeling real conflict situations. We propose a dynamic model with N-agents in an infinite time frame which allow us to adequately analyze conflicts. The dynamic...

This study introduces a novel index based on expectations concordance for explaining stock-price volatility when novel events that are each somewhat unique cause unforeseeable change and Knightian uncertainty in the process driving outcomes. Expectations concordance measures the degree to which...