The prospect theory is one of the most popular decision-making theories. It is based on the S-shaped utility function, unlike the von Neumann and Morgenstern (NM) theory, which is based on the concave utility function. The S-shape brings in mathematical challenges: simple extensions and...

If a decision maker, in a world of uncertainty à la Anscombe and Aumann (1963), can choose acts according to some objective probability distribution (by throwing dice for instance) from any given set of acts, then there is no set of acts that allows an experimenter to test more than the Axiom...

We test the implications of ambiguity aversion in a principal-agent problem with multiple agents. Models of ambiguity aversion suggest that, under ambiguity, comparative compensation schemes may become more attractive than independent wage contracts. We test this by presenting agents with a...

An agent wants to derive her belief over outcomes based on past observations collected in her database (memory). There is well establish evidence in the psychology and marketing literature that agents consistently fail (or choose not) to process all available information. An agent might be...

A decision maker (DM) is asked to make choices from a set of acts, which entail both risk and uncertainty in the sense of knight (1921). Extending Raiffa's (1961) argument I show that, provided the DM can choose acts objectively randomly (by flipping her own fair coin, for instance), provided...

We investigate experimentally preferences between different ambiguous processes generated by two-color Ellsberg urns. By providing symmetric information on urns with different numbers of beads and keeping the information on the most optimistic, pessimistic, and equal probability of winning...

This paper presents a new two-parameter probability weighting function for Tversky and Kahneman (1992) cumulative prospect theory as well as its special cases — Quiggin (1981) rank-dependent utility and Yaari (1987) dual model. The proposed probability weighting function can be inverse...

We introduce a simple, easy to implement instrument for jointly eliciting risk and ambiguity attitudes. Using this instrument, we structurally estimate a two-parameter model of preferences. Our findings indicate that ambiguity aversion is significantly overstated when risk neutrality is assumed....

During recent decades, many new models have emerged in pure and applied economic theory according between Epstein (2010) and Klibanoff et al. (2012) identified a notable behavioral issue that distinguishes sharply between two classes of models of ambiguity sensitivity that are importantly...

For choice with deterministic consequences, the standard rationality hypothesis is ordinality, i.e., maximization of a weak preference ordering. For choice under risk (resp. uncertainty), preferences are assumed to be represented by the objectively (resp. subjectively) expected value of a von...