Intergovernmental fiscal frameworks usually reflect fundamental societal choices and history and are not foremost geared towards achieving economic policy objectives. Yet, like most institutional arrangements, fiscal relations affect the behaviour of firms, households and governments and thereby...

We can enhance development by making it easier for people to “vote with their feet” between jurisdictions. Few, if any, policy reforms can achieve such enormous increases in economic growth and opportunity. Foot voting is, in several crucial respects, a better mechanism of political...

This study examines long run and causal relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic development in Nigeria using annual data from 1970-2011. Both sub-national expenditures ratio and sub national revenue ratio were used to measure fiscal decentralisation in Nigeria. The result of...

Issues of taxation and development, which have long been a central concern of the IMF, have attracted wider and renewed interest in the last few years. This paper reflects on three broad lessons of experience: that developing countries differ vastly in tax matters, and in ways that are less than...

In pre-industrial Europe, the pace of economic development and growth varied across territories and over time. Much of this variation was due to the changing impact of government on the economies in question. Government affected the economy principally through its command of violence. We...

In pre-industrial Europe, government and the economy developed together, each influencing the other. The development of each was shaped by competition. Governments competed for territory, principally by means of war. Their success depended primarily on their ability to mobilize resources. So...

This paper examines whether the federal structure of aid-receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness. Following the decentralization theorem, the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness, since local decision-makers are better informed about local needs. At the same...

We analyze investment decisions when information is costly, with and without delegation to an agent. We use a rational-inattention model and compare it with a canonical signal-extraction model. We identify three "investment conditions". In "sour" conditions, no information is acquired and no...

We analyze the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favorable economic institutions ensure the appropriability of rents in form of a state of law. We study the conditions under which a state of law can be...