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Foreign aid and global governance : buying Bretton Woods ; the Swiss-bloc case
Vreeland, James Raymond - In: The review of international organizations 6 (2011) 3/4, pp. 369-391
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009504921
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The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003948233
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The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003942325
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The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944718
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The costs of favoritism : is politically driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - In: Economic development and cultural change 62 (2013) 1, pp. 157-191
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336273
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Buying votes and international organizations : the dirty work-hypothesis
Dreher, Axel; Lang, Valentin; Rosendorff, B. Peter; … - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012037759
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332994
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The costs of favoritism: is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269460
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The Costs of Favoritism : Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?
Dreher, Axel - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146443
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The Costs of Favoritism : Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?
Dreher, Axel - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146478